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Abstract 
Drawing on an in-depth governance micro-survey of public officials within a country, we address 
empirically the question of the relative importance of the various determinants of governance.  
We investigate the causes of poor governance, and show that commonly made inferences about 
policy based on simple correlation can be highly misleading, because the high correlation 
between the various governance (and public sector management) determinants, as well as the 
endogeneity in these variables. We find that undue emphasis may have been given in previous 
work to a number of conventional public sector management variables (such as civil servant 
wages, internal enforcement of rules, autonomy of agency by fiat, etc.), while undermining the 
priority due to more ‘external’ (to public sector management) variables, such as external voice, 
transparency, and politicization.  The latter set of ‘voice’-related variables has larger affect on the 
quality of service and corruption than the more traditional public sector management type of 
variables.  Further work drawing in depth on country-specific surveys in other settings is 
warranted to ascertain with more confidence whether a shift towards more prominence to 
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1. Introduction 
Efficient governance has been long recognized as an important element in 
improving welfare and economic growth. Yet many countries are plagued with 
incompetent bureaucracy, mismanagement and corruption. Recently, a number of these 
countries have undertaken policies to fight corruption and improve their governance.  
While the empirical literature is growing, to date there is however a limited theoretical 
and empirical findings to guide these policies.  A particular gap in this area is country-
relevant empirical research, where findings and policy recommendations are adapted to  
the particular country setting.  Much of the empirical work is through cross-country 
regressions, and thus with limited policy applicability to a particular country.  
Furthermore, when country-specific data is available, inferences are often made on 
the basis of simple correlation between variables.  As a result, reviewing the writings in 
the governance field one encounters that a very long list of governance-related variables 
matter for performance, whether related to public sector management and compensation, 
voice and accountability, political economy, public finance and the like.  Indeed, in the 
existing studies on the subject, which tend to point to the importance of public sector 
determinants of performance, it is rarely presented that, contrary to conventional wisdom, 
some specific governance or public sector management variable may not be a significant 
determinant for performance -- or at least not as important as others.  It is even rare to 
find writings ascertaining that the significance of oft-touted public sector factors (such as 
civil servant wages, or agency autonomy, for instance) cannot be ascertained.    
At the same time, the cumulative effect of studies at different aspects of public 
sector performance matters (often without shedding light on the others) has tended to 
result in overly long (‘Christmas tree-like’) lists of recommendations to improve 
performance, without sense of providing priorities, and that such priorities may vary 
significantly from one country to another.      
Drawing on an in-depth governance micro-survey within a country, the purpose of 
this paper is to address in depth the question of the relative importance of the various 
determinants of governance.  For that, we undertake to estimate empirically the causes of 
poor governance, using a unique data set from detailed responses of public officials 
working in public sector agencies and municipalities in Bolivia. Based on these estimates   2
we try to shed light on suggested priorities to improve the quality of governance and 
reduce the level of corruption.   
In spite of the pernicious effect of poor governance most policy recommendations 
to fight corruption and improve governance and public sector management are based on 
conclusions from simple correlation between policy variables and various measures of 
governance quality and corruption, usually contained in economic reports at times 
covering a broad spectrum but often excluding rigorous econometrics.  Unconditional 
correlation, however, may be misleading if other factors that affect governance are 
correlated with the policy variable in question. For example, mechanisms ensuring 
transparency are usually correlated with enforcement of rules and regulations, as they are 
often designed simultaneously. In this case, if transparency improves the quality of 
governance, one would find high correlation between enforcement of rules and quality of 
governance even if enforcement has no affect on the quality of governance. 
Additional complications may arise because several policy variables may be 
endogenous.  For example, on one hand, poor transparency may lead to higher level of 
corruption as public official have more discretionary power. On the other hand, 
corruption may lead to poor transparency, as corrupt agents, reluctant to be exposed, 
attempt to weaken information flow. In this case, even conditional correlation (i.e., 
multiple regression) may be misleading. In the appendix, we analyze in more detail the 
bias when one ignores the fact that the variables may be endogenous.  
These econometric problems are not the only source of bias in policy 
recommendations. In the governance literature often when econometrics are utilized, 
recommendations for a particular country setting are often made on the basis of cross-
country regression results, without in-depth agency specific results within the country 
under study. For example, Broadman and Recanatini (2000) investigate the role of market 
institutions on corruption in transition economies. Ades and Di Tella (1999) analyze the 
link between foreign competition and corruption, and Treisman (2000) explores the 
effects of historical and cultural traditions, and political institutions on corruption.  While 
these cross-country empirical papers shed some light on some of the causes of corruption, 
their scope is somewhat limited. Due to data constraints, they are able to analyze only a 
few policy variables based on cross-country differences.    3
  In general, policies to improve governance can be divided between policies that 
emphasize the important of voice, transparency and accountability and policies that 
emphasize the importance of the structure of the institutions such as autonomy, 
decentralization, rules, and wages. Thanks to a unique in-depth public official survey 
carried out in Bolivia, the data set used in this paper allows a comparison of these 
policies utilizing a large set of variables. We find that the voice related variables have 
larger affect on corruption and the quality of services than institutions. Thus, policies to 
improve the quality of governance and reduce corruption should emphasize transparency 
and voice first rather than institutions.  
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we discuss the theoretical 
considerations and present a simple model. Section 3 explains the data and the 
econometric model. In section 4 we present the estimation results. Section 5 discusses 
possible caveats and robustness tests and section 6 concludes.        
 
2. Theoretical Considerations 
  Economic analyses of the determinants of corruption follow Becker’s seminal 
model of crime and punishment (Becker (1968)) or the principal agent theory (e.g., 
Becker and Stigler (1974), Rose-Ackerman (1975), Tirole (1986), Mookherjee and Png 
(1992, 1995)).  Becker (1968) argues that an individual chooses to undertake illegal 
activity if the expected payoffs from illegal activity are greater than the expected payoff 
from legal activities.  Policies to fight corruption, therefore, should focus on increasing 
rewards (wage) on the one hand and enforcement (punishment) on the other hand. Becker 
and Stigler (1974) extended the analysis to a principal-agent setting where because of 
incomplete information the higher-level manager (the “principal”) cannot observe the 
public official (the “agent”) actions. In this model, incomplete information enables the 
corrupt public official to hide his/her corrupt activities
1. Tirole (1986, 1992) extends the 
classic principal-agent framework to a three-tier principal-supervisor-agent hierarchies 
where a supervisor is hired by the principal to monitor the agent. The supervisor’s 
                                                                 
1 The agent may also face some information problems, too. If the public official does not have complete 
information about the individuals’ characteristics, he may use some signaling mechanism (Banerjee (1997)) 
argues that red-tape is one of these instruments that is used to learn about private agents’ willingness to pay 
bribe.    4
usefulness can be compromised if he chooses to collude with the agent rather than reveal 
the information.  
Many scholars have argued that raising officials’ pay will reduce corruption (see, 
for instance, Becker and Stigler, (1974), Klitgaard, (1989), and Haque and Sahay (1996)).  
However, the required pay raise may be prohibitively expensive and it may be cost-
effective for governments to pay “capitulation wages” (that attract only the dishonest) 
rather than raise wages to the high levels required in order to deter corruption (Besley and 
McLaren (1993), Dabla-Norris (2000), and Wane (2000)). Even it is feasible to pay high 
government wage, it may cause misallocation of talent across public and private sector 
(Acemoglu and Verdier (1998)).  Effectiveness of pay hikes as a policy tool to combat 
with corruption has also been criticized.  Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2000) argues that 
when control mechanisms are too weak or too strong, wages do not have any impact on 
corruption. Van Rijckeghem and Weder (1997) argue that the agent may engage in 
corrupt activities only if there is a differential between the actual wage and the “fair” 
wage as perceived by the agent.  
Weakness of hierarchical control mechanisms in corrupt government systems 
exacerbates the harm of corruption, because officials do not coordinate their corrupt 
activities and internalize the externalities (see Shleifer and Vishny (1993), and Walter 
(2000)). In this context even a “stationary bandit” who monopolizes bribe collection is 
preferable to the anarchy of independent agencies (McGuire and Olson, (1996)). 
Rauch and Evans (2000) argue that when jobs and promotions in public service 
are based on political connections, public officials would have less incentive to stay 
“clean” because their prospect in their job is linked to “whom they serve” rather than to 
their performance. Thus, a bureaucracy that offers long-term careers with chances of 
advancement based on merit would result in lower level of corruption.  Politicization of 
institutions, on the other hand, causes economic distortion and corruption through 
inflated budgets and high government pay (Menes, (1999)). 
Another major determinant of corruption is the structure of the private market. It 
was first emphasized by Krueger (1974) that restricting the operation of the market 
through quantitative restrictions causes more welfare cost than the tariff equivalent, since 
shortage economy leads to rent-seeking. It is often argued that market competition 
reduces corruption, but it is also possible that corrupt officials may destroy competition to   5
create room for bribe. Rose-Ackerman (1975) argued that market competition  is not 
sufficient to prevent bribery,  if  firms can play with the terms of contract to create excess 
profit from which the bribe is paid. On the empirical front, however, there is less 
ambiguity. Ades and Di Tella (1997,1999) showed that lack of competition (measured as 
share of imports, antirust law, market dominance, distance to world markets) is 
associated with more corruption (see also Laffont and Tchetche (1999), Svensson (2000), 
Acemoglu and Verdier (2000), and Lerrain and Terrares (2001)). 
In addition to hierarchical systems of administrative control systems based on 
rewards and penalties, accountability mechanisms may also build upon citizen voice (the 
capacity of “outsiders” to express their views to the government officials)  and exit 
(switching to privately supplied services, or moving away from jurisdictions with poor 
public services). People can compare the performances of local governments and if they 
are dissatisfied they can vote the incumbent out of power (Besley and Case 1995, Porto 
and Porto 2000, Gordon and Wilson 2001). Alternatively, they can “vote by their feet” or 
by “their pocket”.  In this case,  a “Bertrand-style” competition takes place and the 
agencies which outbid each other to the bottom until their bribe demand diminishes to 
zero (Tiebout 1956, Besley and Case 1995, Porto and Porto 2000, Gordon and Wilson 
2001).  Gray-Molina et. al.  (1999) find that over-pricing and informal payments to 
municipal health service providers in Bolivia decline significantly in places where 
citizens participate in health board meetings and there exists an exit option in the form of 
private health service provision. Furthermore, they find that formal control and 
supervision mechanisms have no significant affect on corruption behavior. Kuncoro 
(2000) shows decentralization of administration of business licenses in Indonesia has 
created locational preference on the part of individual firms to choose to region with 
lower or optimal bribe. 
State structure, particularly the degree of (political) decentralization has also been 
analyzed in the context of quality of governance.  As Bardhan and Mookherjee (2000b) 
pointed out lack of accountability arises from two factors: political capture by the special 
interest, and the bureaucratic corruption due to agency problem. The second factor is less 
problematic in local governments, whereas more problematic in centralized systems 
(Carbonara 2000). Local capture may be less or more prevailing depending on a 
multitude of diverse factors, such as heterogeneity within a district (more heterogeneity   6
leads to more local corruption), the nature of electoral system (in proportional 
representation limits discretionary power), the size of the country (larger countries have 
more agency problems - thus, more corruption) etc. (Bardhan and Mookherjee 2000a).  
Seabright (1996) argues that decentralization should improve the quality of government 
by bringing officials closer to the people and by encouraging competition between local 
governments.  Other scholars, however, argue that corruption is more prevalent at the 
local level. Tanzi (1995)) argues that high patronage politics and clientelism emerged 
from closer interaction between local governments and citizens. Moreover that 
inefficiencies due to vertical and horizontal coordination problems, lack of qualified 
employees and effective monitoring mechanisms at the local level may increase 
corruption at the local level (Prud’homme, (1994)).  Empirical research on the premises 
of decentralization is inconclusive. Fisman and Gatti (2000) and de Mello and Barenstein 
(2001) report that fiscal decentralization is associated with lower corruption. Treisman 
(2000) finds that corruption is higher in federally structured states and in countries that 
have a more tiers of government. 
This paper offers several contributions to the theoretical analyses of governance. 
First, we assert that corruption and lack of transparency, while related, are conceptually 
distinct concepts and manifestations of misgovernance. While corruption relates to the 
abuse of power to private gains, transparency relates to the availability of information 
within the institution and outside the institution.  
Second, we develop a model where the resulting level of corruption, transparency 
and quality/level of service delivery are the three key decision variables in the hands of 
the public official.  The public official decides on their level that maximizes her welfare 
subject to constraints of course:  higher levels of corruption being subject to bargaining 
with the private agent and to reputational costs; lower levels of transparency subject to 
internal rule-based constraints, lower level of service subject to lower earnings/promotion 
prospects.   
This joint determination of the three key decision variables by the public official 
extends the literature by highlighting the importance of public official incentive structure 
and behavior along these dimensions in determining the level/quality of public service 
delivery.  In particular, incorporating possibility that the link between bribery and service 
delivery may be either a positive or a negative one.  This contrasts much of the literature   7
which either:  i) did not model such link with public service delivery at all, ii) modeled it 
as a simplistic one pre-determined direction where bribery is either 'grease' helping 
businesses by getting around red tape (see for example Lui, (1988)), or “sand” 
exacerbating the red-tape (Kaufmann and Wei, (2000)), iii) modeled 'public service' 
rather superficially, typically as signatures/red tape/licenses, rather than actual public 
goods crucial for development and poverty alleviation.  Hence, our model is a more 
integrative model of governance and public service delivery. Furthermore, in contract to 
other models where the level of Corruption, Transparency or Service Delivery is 
determined taking the level of the other two variables as given, in our model, the levels of 
Corruption, Transparency and Service Delivery are endogenous and determined 
simultaneously.  Policies to improve service delivery, corruption or transparency (as well 
as empirical estimations), therefore, should utilize this complex simultaneous system to 
devise efficient policies. Furthermore, while exogenous, politicization (external negative 
influence) and voice (external positive feedback/pressure) have an important and explicit 
affect on the incentives of public official to settle for a lower (higher) equilibrium in the 
joint determination of the levels of corruption, transparency and service delivery. 
Third, the model formally integrates the importance of institutional norms. 
Deviations from the institutional norms are subject to penalty, etc.  This highlights the 
importance of institutions culture standards. An individual who works in an institutions 
with high level of service quality and well established guidelines and policies will 
provide higher level of quality than an individual who works in an institution with low 
level of service quality (this is the egg and the chicken difficulties in improving 
governance – If one can improve the average level of service then individual public 
officials will improve the level of their services, but until public officials do so the 
average level will not rise.)  Furthermore, it emphasizes the positive (negative) 
externalities of having honest (corrupt) public official.  
 
2.1 A Simple Model of Corruption, Transparency and Service Delivery     
Consider an economy that is composed of a representative public official who 
provides services to n heterogeneous agents (individuals or groups).  Let agent’s i utility 
depends on two elements: the agent’s individual preferences over public services, Xi and 
the service that she receives from the public official, Zi. For example, Xi could be thought   8
of as the individual preference for the water or sanitation service to the agents’ house, the 
qualities of roads in the neighborhood, the amount of taxes (tariffs) for a given good or 
service, building permit and so on, and Zi as the level that is provided.   Specifically, let 




i i i Z X U - - =   (1) 
 
The agent attains maximum utility when the provided service is equal to her individual 
preferences, and declines the larger the difference between the individual preferences and 
the services received. Note that the optimal amount of service is not infinity, but rather a 
finite amount that depends on the individual’s preferences (for example, building too 
many roads, telephone poles, collecting garbage 10 times a day and so on may be greater 
than the level that will maximizes the individual welfare).  
We assume that the institution’s utility is different from the sum of the individual’s 
utility due to externalities or limited resources. For example, construction permits may 
have negative externalities such as traffic congestion or pollution, or the agency has 
enough resources to collect garbage only once a month.  Specifically, let the institution 
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Where b is a parameter that captures the difference between the social welfare and the 
individual welfare (externalities).  If b<1 then the service involves negative externalities 
(or the institution resources are limited). On the other hand, If b>1 then the service 
involves positive externalities.  In order to simplify the exposition we present the solution 
for the case where b<1, which we believe is a more realistic case.
2  We assume that the 
institution has to issue the same policy to each individual (i.e., it can not issue a policy 
that links Zi to Xi .  For example, the institution cannot collect garbage only from some 
houses or requires permits/regulations only from some individuals).  The institution, 
therefore, has to choose a common standard level of service that will be given to each 
                                                                 
2 Note that similarly, one could solve the model for the case where b>1.   9
individual that will maximizes its social welfare. This level which we denote as Z
* can be 
calculated from equation (2) as   
 
X Z b =
*   (3) 
 
where  Xis the average level of preferred service.  Equation (3) states that the services 
with negative externalities or institutions with lower resources will set lower level of 
service.  
The public official who is in charge of supplying Z, however, has a different 
objective.  The public official objective is to maximize her expected income (welfare) 
given a set of incentives that are set by the institution, and the individuals’ demand for 
the services he is providing. In particular, the public official controls the standard level of 
service that is given to every individual unless he pays bribe, Z
P; the level that he delivers 
to individual i in return for a bribe, Zi; and the level of transparency of the service to the 
individual, T (i.e., the information that the individual has about Z*).  Specifically, let bi 
be the amount of bribe that individual i is willing to pay in return for service Zi.  The 
amount of bribe that individual i is willing to pay as a function of the standard service 
and the new service is the difference between the utility given the standard service, (Xi-
Z
p)
2 , and her utility given the new service, (Xi-Zi)
2 , 
 




i i Z X Z X b - - - =   (4) 
 
We assume that the value of the bribe to the public official, or alternatively the 
amount of bribe that the public official receive for a given deviation from Z
P to Zi, 
declines with the level of transparency (i.e., he information available to the individual).  
Intuitively, higher level of transparency reduces the bargaining power of the public 
official and hence he can capture a smaller share from the individual gains. Alternatively, 
higher level of transparency increases the probability of being caught and hence reduces 
the value of the bribe. Even if there is negligible chance of getting caught or punished in 
the near future, the official is reluctant to gain a reputation of being a corrupt person. 
Often, excepting bribes involved besides the intangible costs, such as the probability of   10
losing future employment opportunities, also the danger of being sacrificed as a villain in 
a political crisis, and disapproval and censure from the public
3. To capture this affect of 
transparency, we assume that the value of a bribe to the public official is discounted 
according to the level of transparency and other exogenous variables such as honesty of 
the public official and so on, g(T)  where  g’(T)<0.
4 
5  
In the absent of any restrictions and incentives set by the institution, the public 
official can maximize the amount of bribe by setting the standard level of service, Z
p and 
transparency at their lowest possible levels.  The institution, however, set incentives and 
regulations in order to improve the standard level of services and reduce the amount of 
bribes.  Accordingly, the public official’s expected utility depends on three elements. 
First, it depends on the difference between the optimal level of service, Z* and the 
standard level, Z
p . Every organization provides some rules and policies to guide the 
decision making process in the administration. Officials who deviate from the 
institutional norm have lower (higher) probability of promotion (demotion).  Second, it 
depends on the deviation between the service that individual i gets and the standard level 
of service. The more the public officials deviate from the standard practices and do favors 
to individuals the larger the risk of being caught and punished. Third, it depends on the 
deviation from the transparency standards T*, set by the institution. These standards 
depends on exogenous variables such as quality of rules, citizen voice, well organized 
civic groups and so on. The public official can reduce the transparency level within the 
institution by hiding or changing records, withholding information, not reporting 
transactions, etc. However, the larger are the discrepancies, the lower (higher) the 
probability of promotion (demotion). 
Given this set of incentives the public official wishes to maximize his welfare by 
choosing the standard level of services, Z
p , the level of transparency, T, the service and 
                                                                 
3 Tirole (1996) models the reputation of a group as an aggregate of individual reputations, and shows that 
when the individual behavior is observed with noise, the past behavior of the group can be used to predict 
the member’s individual behavior. This kind of corporate punishment discourages individuals to engage in 
corruption because if they are caught they are also condemned by their peers. Wittman (1989) also cites 
reputation as an important factor that may mitigate the principal-agent problem. 
4 Alternatively, g(T)bi can be seen as the rent paid to the official and (1-g(T))bi is the rent captured by the 
individual. In a more transparent environment the individual would have inside information about the 
formal and informal procedures. Hence, greater transparency would increase the bargaining power of the 
individual and consequently the public official would capture a smaller share of the rent.   11
the bribe of individual i, Zi  and bi  respectively. Specifically, the public official solves the 
following maximization,  
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where f1, f 2, f 3 >0 are parameters that represents the various incentives and T* and Z* are 
the transparency and corruption norm that are set (exist) in the institution.  
The first part of the utility function of the public official is the value of total bribe 
receipts. The remaining terms represent the incentives (the probability of promotion and 
demotion), which consists of three parts: (i) the variance of the services, 
2 P
i )  Z - (Z , (ii) 
the deviation between the standard level and the level set by the institution, 
2 P * )  Z - (Z , 
and (iii) the deviation from the norm level of transparency, 
2 * T) - (T .   
The parameters f1, f 2, f 3 represents the importance of each of the above policy 
incentives. The parameter f1 captures the costs associated with the variance of service, f2 
captures the costs associated with deviation from the institutional norm, and f3 represents 
the costs associated with deviation from the institutional norm of transparency. All three 
parameters would be higher in institutions that are successful in monitoring their 
employees effectively and enforcing their internal rules consistently. On the other hand, 
in highly politicized institutions where patronage politics and favoritism is rampant f1 and 
f 2 would be small.  
In general, the incentive structures (i.e., f1, f2, and f3 times the respective element) 
represent the loss in the expected lifetime earnings (the change in lifetime promotion-
career path and pension) given a set of action (i.e., Z
p, Zi, bi and T).  It other words, it 
represents the combination of the present value of lost earnings times the probability of 
penalty being carried out in the face of (various types of) norm deviation.  The fact that 
promotion prospects depend differently on the various deviations is captured by the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
5 One could consider also other forms of transparency. For example, transparency about the deviation of the 
standard level from the norm or the variance of services.  We leave these forms of corruption for future 
research.    12
distinct f’s.  In general, in institution where lifetime earnings are pitifully low (and there 
is no pension), or the alternative life time earnings (e.g., the wage in the private sector) is 
relatively high the costs that is captured by the various f's would never constitute a 
serious cost factor for the public official, regardless of how transparent/voice-full the 
institutional regime is.  Thus, one would expect that higher wages would be associated 
with higher losses of expected lifetime earning (i.e., high f’s).  Note, however that in 
general it is not the current level of wages that matters but the changes in all future wages 
that is important.     
The public official chooses the level of Z
p, Zi, and T to solve his optimization 
problem specified in (5). The standard level of service, Z
p , the individual service, Zi, and 
the level of transparency, T, are given by the first order conditions of equation (5) with 
respect to Z
p, Zi, and T respectively, provided that f1 and f2 are sufficiently large to satisfy 
the second order conditions 
6:  
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Equation (6) states that the public official sets the standard level of service such 
that the increase in bribes from decreasing the standard service by one unit (the first term) 
are equal to the costs from such an increase (the increase in the variability and the larger 
deviation from the institutional norm, the second and the third terms respectively).  
Equation (7) states that the level of service provided to each individual is such that the 
increase in bribes from providing another unit to individual i (the first term) is equal to 
the costs of deviating from the standard level.  Finally, equation (8) states that the level of 
transparency set by the public official is such that the increase in the value of bribes due 
to lower transparency (the first term) is equal to the costs from decreasing transparency 
(the second term). 
                                                                 
6 These second order conditions are  (i)  0 f n f ) T ( ng 2 1 < - - , and (ii)  0 ) T ( g f f f ) T ( ng 2 2 1
2 < - - .  
When the second order conditions do not hold the solution is to set the standard level at minus infinity.      13
Equations (6)-(8) can be solved to yield the optimal (from the public official point 
of view) standard level of service, the level provided to each individual and the level of 
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The standard level of services is given in equation (9)
 7.  Since  X Z
* <  (as long, as 
there are negative externalities in the provision of public services or the institution has 
limited resources,  1 < b ), the public official sets a standard service that is below the 
institutional norm. Intuitively, the public official by reducing the standard level increases 
her leverage in providing higher service and hence the possible bribe. In other words, by 
setting the standard level at a level below the norm, the public official can capture bribes 
by simply providing individuals the norm.  Higher transparency reduces the benefits from 
bribe and hence reduces the incentives to lower the standard level and attain larger 
amount of bribes. Likewise, larger costs of deviating from the norm, f2, and large costs of 
deviating from the standard level, f1, increase the standard level. The larger these costs 
are the closer the standard level to the norm.  
 Equation (10) describes the service level provided to individual i who pays bribe, 
Zi. This level is a weighted average of the individual preferences (Xi) and the standard 
service level, where the weights are given by g(T) and f1 respectively. The lower the 
transparency (higher g(T)) and the smaller the costs of deviating from the norm, (f1), the 
closer is the level provided to individual i to her preferences (i.e., Zi is closer to Xi ). In 
other words, when transparency is poor, or the costs of providing difference levels is 
                                                                 
7 Note that from the second order condition the denominator is positive.   14
small, individuals can pay bribe and get the service they wish.  Transparency creates a 
distinction between the value of bribe to the individual and the value to the public official 
and hence reduces the amount of favoritism that an individual can buy.  
Finally, the level of transparency is given in equation (11). Transparency depends 
positively on the norm level, T
*, and the costs of deviating from this level, f3, and it 
depends negatively on the amount of bribes and the affect of a change in the level of 
transparency on the value of the bribe g’(T).  
The amount of bribe that each individual will pay can be calculated by substituting 
the values of Zi and Z
p from equations (9) and (10) in equation (4), 
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The amount of bribe that individual i pays depends on the difference between the 
individual preference and the standard level. Individuals with large preferences, Xi, pay 
larger bribe while individuals whose preferences are equal to the standard level will not 
pay any bribe. Likewise, an increase in the costs of favoritism, f1, will reduce the level of 
bribe that individual i pays.   
The total amount of bribe can be calculating simply by aggregating over all 
individuals,  
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While some individuals may pay lower bribe if the standard level is lower (and benefit 
from the lower level), overall since  X Z
* <  the lower the standard level the larger the 
total amount of bribe (and the lower the total welfare) average utility of those who pay 
bribe and those who do not pay bribe).     
It is important to note that corrupt behavior itself need not impose a social cost 
since it involves transfer payments from bribe payers to the bureaucrats. In this model the 
social loss from corruption arises from the deviation of the effective standard service   15
level, Z
P from the socially optimal level, Z*.  in other words, the public official sets lower 
level of service in order to increase the demand for his services.     
Note that transparency (equation (11)) does not depend directly on the costs of 
preferential treatment, f1, or the cost of deviating from the institutional norm, f2.  These 
costs affect the level of transparency through their affect on the level of corruption, but 
do not affect transparency once the affect of corruption is controlled. Similarly, the level 
of corruption (equation (12)) does not depend on the cost of deviating from the 
transparency standards, f3, nor on the standard level of transparency, T*, or on the change 
in the value of bribe when transparency changes, g’(T). Thus, although service 
performance, corruption and transparency are endogenous variables that are determined 
simultaneously, because some variables are excluded from each equation it is possible to 
estimate the system. 
 
3. Data and econometric estimations 
3.1 Econometric Model and Data source 
 
Equations (9), (11), and (13) present a simultaneous system of equations that can be 
estimated using an econometric techniques. Specifically, the model implies the following 
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Note that we also add corruption to the service quality equation to capture the 
possibility of potential effect of corruption on service quality. 
Theoretically speaking the system can be estimated if the number of excluded 
variables is greater than the number of endogenous variables in each equation. In 
particular, f3 and T* are excluded from the service performance equation; f2, f3, Z* and 
T* are excluded from the corruption equation, and service performance,f1, f2 and Z* are 
excluded from the transparency equation. The empirically task is to construct (identify)   16
variables that represent the variables/ parameters of the model and then estimate the 
system using these variables.      
The source of our data set is survey of 1250 public officials working in 110 public 
institutions in Bolivia. These public institutions include top executive branches (e.g. 
offices of the President and Vice President); ministries (e.g. education, health, finance); 
line agencies (e.g. customs, tax, immigration); autonomous agencies (e.g. central bank); 
departmental institutions; and municipal governments. Each institution in the sample 
delivers services demanded by at least five percent of the population. Within each 
institution, a stratified random sample of at least 1 percent of all staff was selected at each 
of the following decision-making ranks: top management, middle management, and rank 
and file. 
Each observation represents the average response of all agents in the same 
organization. Thus, each observation point in our data set is a public agency. For quality 
purposes, only agencies with at least five respondents are used. Based on the Public 
Officials Survey we constructed the following variables that we use in the econometric 
analysis (see Table 1). A detailed description of the survey questions we used to construct 
each variable is reported in the appendix.   17
Table 1: Description of the Variables 
Variable  Measure 
Service Performance 
The average of three standardized service delivery indicators (if applicable): quality, 
quantity, and accessibility. The index is re-scaled using the mean and standard deviation of 
national service, such that high numbers correspond to high performance in service delivery. 
Bribery Index 
The average of two standardized bribery indicators: frequency of bribery, and bribe/official 
income ratio. The index is re-scaled using the mean and standard deviation of  corruption at 
the national level, such that high numbers correspond to high corruption. 
Corruption Index 
The average of four standardized corruption indicators: frequency of bribery, bribe/official 
income ratio, percent of jobs purchased, and percent of budget diverted illegally. The index 
is re-scaled using the mean and standard deviation of  corruption at the national level, such 
that high numbers correspond to high corruption. 
Transparency  Percent of cases where the actions of the public officials and the decision making are 
transparent 
Enforcement  Percent of the cases where rules, guidelines, regulations, and processes in the personnel, 
budget, and service management are strictly monitored and enforced 
Meritocracy  Percent of the cases where he decisions on personnel management issues are based on level 
of education, or professional experience, merit, and performance. 
Politicization  Percent of cases where decision on personnel, budget, and service management are free from 
political interference 
Autonomous Agencies 
Central Bank, Bank and Finance Superintendence, Telecommunication Superintendence 
Hierarchical Affairs Superintendence, Transportation Superintendence, National 
Comptroller, Electoral Court, Constitutional Tribune, Supreme Court, Ombudsman, Judicial 
Council. 
Resources  Percent of cases where the physical, financial, and human resources of the agency are 
adequate 
Values 
The probability that if a public official was overpaid by an administrative error. the public 
official will return the money given that there is 100% chance of not getting caught and the 
superiors are doing the same without getting caught. 
Voice  An index representing the existence of consumer feedback and complaint mechanisms 
Wages  The extent of satisfaction with the wages and other benefits. 
 
 
The variables constructed above can be used to identify/construct  the various 
parameters of the model.  In the next section we estimate these parameters using various 
methods, including ordinary-least-squares (OLS), two-stage-least-squares (2SLS), and 
three-stage-least-squares (3SLS).
 8  
                                                                 
8 It might be argued that in case of endogeneity problem, an instrumental variable technique (2SLS/3SLS) should 
always be preferred as the OLS estimator is known to be biased inconsistent. However, the choice of an estimator in a 
“small” sample remains a puzzle in the literature. In many empirical studies the OLS estimator is often found to be 
close to the 2SLS/3SLS estimator, which is not surprising since nearly all applications are based on small samples and 
2SLS/3SLS may produce biased estimators in small samples. Similarly, although system methods (3SLS) are to be 
preferred to single-equation methods (2SLS), Monte Carlo studies suggest that the advantage of the system estimators 
in finite samples is more modest than the asymptotic results would suggest  (Intriligator 1984). Green (2000) argues 
that "it is often found that OLS estimator is surprisingly close to the structural estimator".  Nakamura and Nakamura 
(1985) show that the asymptotic bias of the OLS estimator will be smaller if  (i) a larger proportion of the variability in   18
Recall from the discussion in the model that g(.) is the discount value of the bribe 
that the public official receives. Thus, it depends on the moral values of the public 
official (and transparency of course); Z* is the norm of the service which is captured by 
the resources of the institution, decentralization, and the citizen voice; f1, the costs of 
deviating from the standard service level and f2, the costs of deviating from the service 
norms depends on the enforcement of rules, politicization, resources of the institution 
(“monitoring capacity”), meritocracy, and wage; while f3, the costs of deviating from the 
transparency norms depends on the variables above except meritocracy; T* the norm 
level of transparency depends on the level of education – the norm for transparency is 
higher in institutions with more educated workers, agency autonomy, and the citizen 
voice – existence of user feedback mechanisms enhances internal transparency. 
The considerations above yield the following model of simultaneous equations that 
we estimate below using several methods,  
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As discussed above the model is identifiable since in each equation the number of 
excludable variables is greater than the number of endogenous regressors
9. Specifically, 
education, and agency autonomy are excluded from the service performance equation; 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
the endogenous regressor is explained by the instrumental variables, and (ii) the goodness-of-fit is larger in the 
structural equation of the endogenous regressor. Moreover, standard asymptotic approximations to the distributions of 
instrumental variables break down if the instruments are weak. If the instruments are weak 2SLS estimator is biased in 
the direction of the OLS estimator.  
 
9 This condition, known as order condition, is necessary but not sufficient for identification. The rank 
condition of identification of an equation, which is necessary and sufficient, requires the rank of the matrix 
of coefficients in other equations is not less than the number of endogenous regressors.    19
decentralization, voice, education, and agency autonomy are excluded from the 
corruption equation; and meritocracy, and decentralization are excluded from the 
transparency equation. 
 
3.2 Econometric Estimations 
We estimate the system using four methods. First, we use simple correlation 
between the variables. Second, we estimate a linear least square of each equation 
separately. Third, we estimate the system using two-stage-least-square (2SLS) and finally 
we estimate the system using three-stage-least-square (3SLS). First, we use the bribery 
index as a measure of craft. The results presented in Table 2a. Then, we repeat the same 
exercise in Table 2b using corruption index which is a broader index capturing illegal 
budget diversion and purchase of public positions, as well as frequency and level of 
bribery.   
Note that the simple correlations are substantially different than the other 
estimations as reported in Tables 2a and 2b. This highlight again the large bias in simple 
correlation and the danger in designing policies based on simply correlation.  Second, 
OLS, 2SLS and 3SLS, provide similar estimates for most of the variables, with the 
exception of  the effect of transparency on service delivery and corruption. 
A more detailed examination of the result yield the following conclusions: quality 
of services depends negatively on the level of corruption and positively on the voice of 
the citizens and transparency. Corruption depends positively on politicization and 
negatively on transparency and meritocracy. Finally transparency is affected positively 
by voice, and negatively by corruption and politicization.  In particular, there is no 
evidence that institutional variables such as wage and enforcement of rules have any 
significant direct effect on corruption.  
   20  
 
Table 2a: Estimation results for Bribery Index 
All variables are scaled from 0 to 100. Service performance index is the average of three standardized service delivery indicators (if applicable): quality, quantity, and accessibility. Bribery index represents 
the average of two standardized bribery indicators: frequency of bribery and bribe/official income ratio. The indices are re-scaled using the mean and standard deviation of national service quality and 
bribery, respectively such that high numbers correspond to high performance and high corruption. Number of observations in each public institution is chosen as the weight of each institution in the 
regression. In the first stage 8 region dummies are used as additional exogenous variables. Sample size is 89. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%., † significant at 15 %. 
 
 
    Dependent Variable: Service Delivery  Dependent Variable: Bribery  Dependent Variable: Transparency   
Variable 
Model  Simple 
Correlation  OLS  2SLS  3SLS 
Simple 
Correlation  OLS  2SLS  3SLS 
Simple 
Correlation  OLS  2SLS  3SLS  Variable 
Service 





 (0.99)  0.72***        Service 
Performance 










(-2.47)  Bribery 










(-2.62)          Transparency 
Resource 

































(-2.21)  Politicization 
Wage 







































































        Meritocracy 





(-1.91)                  Decentralization 





























Adj.R2      0.64  0.55  0.44    0.47  0.39  0.38    0.63  0.61  0.55  Adj.R2 
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Table 2b: Estimation results – for Corruption Index 
All variables are scaled from 0 to 100. Service performance index is the average of three standardized service delivery indicators (if applicable): quality, quantity, and accessibility. Corruption index 
represents the average of four standardized corruption indicators: frequency bribery, bribe/official income ratio, job purchases, and budget diversion. The indices are re-scaled using the mean and standard 
deviation of national service quality and bribery, respectively such that high numbers correspond to high performance and high corruption. Number of observations in each public institution is chosen as the 
weight of each institution in the regression. In the first stage 8 region dummies are used as additional exogenous variables. Sample size is 83. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%, 
† significant at 15 %. 
 
    Dependent Variable: Service Delivery  Dependent Variable: Corruption  Dependent Variable: Transparency   
Variable  Model 
Simple 
Correlation  OLS  2SLS  3SLS 
Simple 
Correlation  OLS  2SLS  3SLS 
Simple 
Correlation  OLS  2SLS  3SLS  Variable 
Service 
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(2.23)  Education 
Adj.R2      0.55  0.43  0.36    0.50  0.47  0.49    0.59  0.58  0.56  Adj.R2 
 
  
When there are several variables that are determined endogenously the full effect 
of a change in any of the exogenous variable may be very different from the direct effect. 
For example, an increase in voice will improve transparency that will reduce corruption 
that will increase transparency even further. In order to estimate the full effect of policy 
variables one has to calculate the reduced form equations using the estimates of the 
structural equations (i.e. incorporating the linkage between the various endogenous 
variables). Table 3 presents the effects of various exogenous variables calculated from 
the reduced form equations.  The effect of many policy variables is substantially larger 
when one considers the full effect. The effect of voice on corruption increases due to its 
effect on transparency, which has a significant impact on corruption. Similarly, the effect 
of politicization on corruption also becomes stronger because corruption causes less 
transparency that, in turn, leads to even more corruption. However, none of the public 
sector management factors, such as rule enforcement and government pay, or individual 
characteristics such as moral values and education do not seem to have a significant 
impact on corruption.  
Table 3: Estimation of Reduced Form Parameters of Bribery and Service Quality 
Equations: Simple Effect versus Full Effect 
 
The simple effect (“direct effect”) is based on the 3SLS estimates of the structural parameters reported in Table2. Full effect 
(“direct” plus “indirect” effect) results are based on the relationship between the structural variables and the dependent 
variables in the  reduced form equations of the system. It uses the 3SLS technique and transform the coefficients considering 
the interactions between variables. For each variable the value of the effect is equal to moving an agency one standard 
deviation from the worst practice to the best practice, keeping remaining variables constant at their previous levels for that 
agency. The percent improvement is calculated by taking the ratio of improvement to the existing level. 
 
 
Improvement of Service Quality  
as a result of One Standard 
Deviation Improvement in Policy 
Variable 
Decrease in Bribery  
as a result of One Standard 
Deviation Improvement in 
Policy Variable 
Increase in Transparency 
as a result of One Standard 
Deviation Improvement in 
Policy Variable 
  Simple Effect  Full Effect  Simple Effect  Full Effect  Simple Effect  Full Effect 
Bribery*  3.7 %  9.1 %      4.3 %  4.3 % 
Transparency*  9.1 %  19.1 %  64.1 %  71.3 %     
Voice  7.2 %  22.6 %    50.8 %  7.2 %  16.2 % 
Politicization  2.6 %  20.7 %  18.1 %  73.6 %  4.1 %  17.3 % 
Enforcement of Rules  2.1 %  9.6 %   4.0 %   18.0 %   2.6 %   7.6 %  
Wages Satisfaction  0.5 %  6.6 %  7.6 %  15.7 %  1.0 %  5.6 % 
Resource Envelope  3.6 %  3.1 %   3.5 %  2.0 %   -1.2 %  -1.5 % 
Individual Values  0.3 %  1.7 %  2.1 %  3.2 %  1.5 %  2.6 % 
Meritocracy  0.5 %  5.2 %  9.3 %  12.3 %    4.0 % 
Decentralization  - 7.7 %  - 7.3 %    - 3.4 %    -0.6 % 
Agency Autonomy    4.7 %    4.2 %  -3.6 %  -5.9 % 
Education    4.5 %    7.0 %  2.1 %  4.9 % 
* Since bribery and transparency are endogenous variables, they are not part of the reduced form equations. The full effect is 
calculated based on the two equations in which the dependent variable is different (i.e. transparency and service equations for 
the bribery, bribery and service equations for the transparency) 
 
 
Overall the results show that policy recommendations on the basis of simple 
correlations can be highly misleading. An undue emphasis may have been given in a 
number of conventional public sector management variables (such as civil servant wages, 
internal enforcement of rules, autonomy of agency by fiat, etc), while undermining the 
priority due to more ‘external’ (to public sector management) variables, such as external 
voice and transparency, and to the absence of politicization.  The latter set of ‘voice’-
related variables come out clearly significant and accounting for a much larger share of 
the variation in public sector performance and corruption than the former, more 
traditional public sector management type of variables. 
 
  
4. Decentralization and Corruption  
It is often argued that decentralization is the main cause of corruption and lack of 
services quality.  Indeed, comparing institutional performance at the local and central 
level reveals large differences. Table-4 presents the differences between local and central 
agencies in our data set regarding service quality and corruption. For example, local 
agencies are short in delivering adequate quantity of public services but are more 
successful in being accessible to the poor and reducing poverty than other agencies. 
Bribery and budget diversion are more prevalent at the local level, but ratio of bribe to 
official income is higher at the central level.  
 
Table 4: Decentralization and Governance 
Mean score of agencies within each group is reported. All indices are between 0 and 100. A two-sample t-test is 
performed to test the hypothesis that the variable has the same mean within municipalities and other agencies. *** 
significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%, † significant at 15%. 
 






Service Performance Index  61.10  63.33  60.63 
Quality  60.91  59.61  61.57 
Quantity  55.13  51.34*  57.73 
Accessibility  55.53  60.12**  53.56 
Corruption Index  67.37  68.80  67.05 
Frequency of Bribery  33.41  40.43**  31.03 
% of Jobs Purchased  10.72  9.12  11.23 
% of Budget Diverted  8.73  11.82**  7.12 




As argued above, however, one should be very careful from reaching any 
conclusions based solely on these differences since the correlation can be an outcome of 
other variables. For example, it could be that public officials in local agencies are less 
educated and hence transparency is lower (and corruption is higher). In this case, 
centralization will not reduce corruption since the cause is the low level of education 
rather than decentralization per se.  A comparison of governance characteristics between 
local and national agencies indeed reveals significant differences (see Table 5).  
Municipalities are more politicized, less meritocratic and have less educated personnel. 
However, citizen voice is more prevalent at the local level.  Thus, the differences in the  
level of corruption is not because decentralization but rather because decentralized 
institutions have different characteristics. Future research is needed to determined 
whether these characteristics depend on the level of decentralization or are exogenous to 
decentralization.      
 
Table 5: Decentralization and Institutional Characteristics 
Mean score of agencies within each group is reported. All indices are between 0 and 100. A two-sample t-test is 
performed to test the hypothesis that the variable has the same mean within municipalities and other agencies. *** 
significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%, † significant at 15%. 
 
 






Transparency Index  66.31  66.63  66.24 
Meritocracy Index  63.02  59.13*  63.94 
Autonomous Agency  0.08  0.00*  0.09 
% of University Education  61.35  42.45***  65.35 
Rule Enforcement  60.43  62.98  59.87 
Politicization Index  40.08  47.92***  38.36 
Resource Envelope Index  51.27  51.71  51.18 
Individual Honesty Index  43.93  42.68  44.20 
Voice Index  34.17  38.92†  33.07 
Wage Satisfaction Index  34.44  34.64  34.41 
 
 
5. Caveats and Robustness tests  
 
5.1. Measurement Errors in Variables 
The Public Officials survey is based on the perceptions of public officials about the 
service performance and the institutional characteristics of the institutions they are 
working in. Although this approach is useful in cases where hard data is difficult or 
impossible to produce, it is subject to respondent bias and other measurement problems. 
We classify these problems into two groups: i.) individual bias, and ii.) institutional bias. 
First, public officials may overstress or understate particular aspects of their 
institution (such as corruption level) due to differences in their perception caused by 
differences in their individual characteristics such as education, age, gender, working 
experience, etc. However, the sample in each institution is very diverse (it covers young, 
senior, less educated, male, female and so on) and is similar across institutions. Since we  
use institutional average as an observation unit, these perception errors caused by 
individual characteristics do not carry over to the institutional level.  
Second, it is possible that all individuals working in a particular agency may be 
more pessimistic or optimistic in their perceptions due to working conditions within their 
organization. This is a major concern particularly in cross-country studies in which a 
common reference point or criteria to measure qualitative variables might be impossible 
to find due to cultural differences between societies. We do not believe that this is the 
case in our data since all observations are from the same country, sharing a common 
culture, norms, and moral values. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that each person 
uses the same criteria to make a judgment about the conditions of their own institution 
and differences in perceptions (if any) are individual-specific rather than institutional 
specific. 
To test the validity of our arguments above we use a survey question, which should 
presumably be answered in the same way by all public officials: the corruption level in 
the Bolivian public sector in general. Deviation from the sample average captures the 
influence of individual characteristics as well as the institution effect. We find that 
institutional bias is very small and hence conclude that the bias is very small or nil.    
 
5.2   Model Specification and Instruments 
The instruments used in the first stage of the 2SLS and 3SLS estimation are the 
entire set of exogenous variables of the model.  The choice of adequate instruments for 
corruption and service delivery performance is not extensively addressed in the literature 
(see, however, Bai and Wei, 2000, Svensson, 2000, Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-
Lobaton, 1999)) and even almost non-existent for transparency. In the context of 2SLS 
and 3SLS two requirements for a variable to be used as a good instrument are that it is 
not correlated with the error term of the dependent variable and that it is correlated with 
the endogenous regressor it is instrumented for.  
It is possible that some of the exogenous variables are endogenous as well. Since 
we use these exogenous variables as instruments for the dependent variables, their 
endogeneity may undermine the quality of instruments and cause biased estimates.  For 
example, one could argue that wage which we assume is an exogenous variable in the 
corruption equation is endogenous. That is, the wage rate may depend on the level of  
corruption, if agencies with large corruption might pay high wage.. We use Hausman 
Test to test the possibility that some of the exogenous variables are indeed endogenous, 
but find no evidence that any of the exogenous variables are indeed
10 
11. 
When it comes to measure the “goodness: of an instrument, R
2 of the first stage 
regression is a practical measure used extensively in the literature. The first stage 
regressions for the three endogenous variables yield high adj.R
2 (0.51 for service 
delivery, 0.55 for corruption, and 0.70 for transparency). Shea (1998) argued that R
2 can 
be a useful measure of relevance only in the case of univariate models and proposed a 
new R
2 measure when there are multiple endogenous variables.  For each of the three 
endogenous variables, this statistics is also found to be around 0.71. 
One possible model specification error is that we excluded exogenous variable 
from a specific equation incorrectly. For example, it is possible that meritocracy affects 
the level of transparency and hence it should not be excluded from the transparency 
equation. We test the overidentifying restrictions using Hausman test and fail to reject the 




Drawing on an in-depth governance micro-survey within a country, the purpose of 
this paper was to address empirically the question of the relative importance of the 
various determinants of governance at the micro-level.  We estimated empirically the 
                                                                 
10 The test is based on the existence of two alternative estimators: one is consistent and asymptotically 
efficient under the null hypothesis and the other is consistent under null and alternative hypothesis, but not 
efficient under the null hypothesis. The null hypothesis states that the variables which are assumed to be 
exogenous are indeed exogenous. In the alternative hypothesis a variable that enters to the system 
exogenous previously is treated as endogenous and estimated using other exogenous variables (without 
specifying a structural equation). 3SLS is used  for estimation of coefficients in the system. The estimates 
are consistent under both hypothesis but not efficient under null hypothesis. On the other hand, our original 
3SLS results are consistent under the null hypothesis but inconsistent under the alternative hypothesis. If 
the difference between estimates are “large enough” we reject the null hypothesis that variable in question 
is exogenous. 
11 Although the Hausman test shows that there is no evidence of endogenity problem in the model, this test 
result should be interpreted with caution. The Hausman Test as well as other specification tests in the 
literature are based asymptotic properties which may not be justified in small samples. Both theoretical 
studies and Monte-Carlo experiments (such as Nakuman and Nakuman 1985, Newey 1985) conclude that 
any such test may fail against misspecification of the model.  
12  The test  is based on regressing the residuals from each equation to the entire set of exogenous variables. 
Under the null hypothesis of overidentifying restrictions, the test statistic, NR
2 (N is the sample size and R
2 
the goodness of fit) has a c
2 distribution with K-T degrees of freedom, where K is the number of exogenous 
variables and T is the number of endogenous variables. The value of the test statistic (and corresponding p 
values) are found as 11.01 (0.82), 15.65 (0.55), 18.03 (0.42).  
causes of poor governance, using a unique data set from detailed responses of public 
officials working in public sector agencies and municipalities in Bolivia.  We show that 
commonly made inferences about policy based on (at best) simple correlation can be 
highly misleading, given the high degree of multicollinearity between the various 
governance (and public sector management) determinants, as well as the endogeneity in 
these variables – implying existence of reverse causality.  In fact, if policy 
recommendations were to have been made on the basis of simple correlations, undue 
emphasis would have been given to certain public sector management variables (such as 
relative wages, internal enforcement of rules, autonomy of agency by fiat, etc), while 
undermining the priority due to a different set of (more ‘external’ to public sector 
management) variables such as external voice and transparency and to the absence of 
politicization.  The latter set of ‘voice’-related variables come out clearly significant and 
accounting for a much larger share of the variation than the former, more traditional 
public sector management type of variables.   
By making the case on the importance of studying in depth with micro-level data 
a particular country setting, we need to be particularly wary of implying that the above 
results would necessarily hold in other countries.  Indeed, our claims at this early stage of 
this type of research with this new type of survey data ought to be modest.  While we are 
confident about claiming that in any country there will be a set of potential determinants 
that matter for performance significantly more than others (and we need to stress that 
some conventional variables may not matter significantly as commonly thought), the 
nature of which particular variables matter most may vary from setting to setting.  
Furthermore, we need to keep in mind that the nature of these data sets imply a margin of 
error due to the subjective nature of many of its questions (although significant effort 
went into survey question design and utilization of the various related questions under 
each category).   In a separate effort, we are testing whether the results are consistent with 
the individual level public official behavior (vs. agency-level performance, as in this 
paper).  We are also starting to undertake a similar analysis of agency performance in 
other countries for which we have gathered data. 
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The Effect of Various Governance Dimensions on Service Performance 
 
In the plotgram below, each point represents a public sector (central, departmental, or municipal) agency. The  
fitted line is the predicted linear link between the dependent variable and the independent variable, which is 
calculated from the  reduced form equation using the 3SLS estimates of the system (From Tables 2 and 3). The 
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In the plotgram below, each point represents a public sector (central, departmental, or municipal) agency. The  
fitted line is the predicted linear link between the dependent variable and the independent variable, which is 
calculated from the  reduced form equation using the 3SLS estimates of the system (From Tables 2 and 3). The 





































































































































r = - .32  
The Effect of Various Governance Dimensions on Service Performance  
 
In the plotgram below, each point represents a public sector (central, departmental, or municipal) agency. The  
fitted line is the predicted linear link between the dependent variable and the independent variable, which is 
calculated from the  reduced form equation using the 3SLS estimates of the system (From Tables 2 and 3). The 
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In the plotgram below, each point represents a public sector (central, departmental, or municipal) agency. The  
fitted line is the predicted linear link between the dependent variable and the independent variable, which is 
calculated from the  reduced form equation using the 3SLS estimates of the system (From Tables 2 and 3). The 
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In the plotgram below, each point represents a public sector (central, departmental, or municipal) agency. The  
fitted line is the predicted linear link between the dependent variable and the independent variable, which is 
calculated from the  reduced form equation using the 3SLS estimates of the system (From Tables 2 and 3). The 


























































































r = .40  
The Effect of Various Governance Dimensions on Corruption  
 
In the plotgram below, each point represents a public sector (central, departmental, or municipal) agency. The  
fitted line is the predicted linear link between the dependent variable and the independent variable, which is 
calculated from the  reduced form equation using the 3SLS estimates of the system (From Tables 2 and 3). The 











































































Appendix  - Misleading statistics  
 
It is important to describe how making the wrong assumptions or using the wrong 
estimation method may result in wrong and misleading conclusions. In particular, we 
focus on two cases. First, we discuss why simple correlation may be very misleading. 
Second, we discuss the bias in estimating each equation separately using OLS, which 
ignores the fact that some of the variables are endogenous.  
 
Simple correlation  
Suppose that one wishes to learn about the effect of x on y (e.g., the effect of 
transparency on corruption).  One possible way is to calculate the correlation between x 
and y.  Alternatively, one could graph the data points with x on the horizontal axes and y 
on the vertical axes and visualize the relationship between x and y.  Formally, this is 
equivalent to regressing y on x and a constant,  
e b a + + = x y .                  (1) 
where e is a random noise with zero mean. Note that b is the element that the graphical 
presentation tries to identify and is very closely related to the simple correlation between 





r b =                     (2) 
where Sx and Sy are the standard deviation of x and y respectively.  Since standard 
deviation is always positive, the slope of the regression and the correlation have the same 
sign and differ only by the ratio of the standard deviations.  
  If y depends on other variables as well (which is often the case) and these 
variables are correlated with x, then the simple correlation (b) may be very misleading 
(i.e., different from the real effect of x on y).  To see it consider the case where the true 
model is    
e + g + b + a = z x y                   (3) 
If one regress y on x and a constant as in equation (1) then the estimation of b (the 
correlation between x and y) is bias, if x and z are correlated.  Specifically, the 
expectation of the estimation of b, b, is    
) x ( Variance
) z , x ( iance var Co
) b ( E g + b = .              (4) 
The bias depends on the covariance between the omitted variable, z and x, and on g, the 
effect of z on y. It is obvious that this bias could be very large. In other words, it is 
possible to find a strong positive (negative) correlation between x and y even though the 
real effect of x on y is negative (positive).  In general, simple correlation will be 
misleading whenever the dependent variable depends on other variables that are 
correlated with the variable we wish to learn about.    
 
Multiple Regression 
Multiple regression in the example above, assuming that one includes all the 
relevant variable, will yield the right effect of x on y. Multiple regression, however, may 
be misleading as well (i.e., different from the real effect of x on y) if several of the 
independent variable are endogenous.  To see it consider the following system  
h + d + l =
e + g + b + a =
y x
z x y
                  (5)   





h  respectively.  The problem with estimating the y equation in (5) using OLS in this 
case is that x is correlated with the error term, e, and hence the estimation of b will be 






















= x iance Co .              (7) 
Since the error term in the y equation is correlated with x, If one use OLS to estimate the 
equation on y the estimation of b will be bias, although there are no omitted variable in 
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Since 
2
x s  in this simple system depends on z and e, we can substitute for 
2
x s in equation 
(8) and get  
( )( )
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- = -          (9) 
The bias depends on two elements. First, the difference between the effect of x on y in 
the first equation, b, and one over the effect of y on x in the second equation, 1/d (i.e., the 
difference in the relationship between x and y in the two equations). The similar the 
effects,  the smaller the bias. For example, if the effect of x on y in the first equation is 
positive and the affect of y on x in the second equation is negative then the bias from 
regressing y on x may be very large. On the other hand, if the affects are similar than the 
bias will be very small. Second the bias is smaller, the smaller the affect of y on x (i.e., 
the smaller d). If y has large affect on x and one ignores it and estimate the equation of y 
using OLS the  coefficient on x may be very bias.   
  Our system is, of course, more complicated than this simple model. Specifically, 
we have three endogenous variables and many exogenous variables. Thus, it is hard to 
calculate analytically the bias when one uses OLS, 2SLS or 3SLS. Our results indicate, 
however, that the effect of the endogenous variables are larger and more significant when 
we use two or three SLS to estimate the system compare to multiple regression.  
  It is important to note however, that in a finite sample OLS may still perform very 
well compare to all other methods. For example, Intriligator (1984) claims that "while 
OLS yields estimators that are biased and inconsistent, it should not be rejected as 
estimation technique for simultaneous-equation systems... as little is known concerning 
the finite sample properties of any estimators, OLS may be as good as any other method 
of estimators estimation."  Likewise Green (2000) argues that "it is often found that OLS 
estimator is suprisingly close to the structural estimator". Nakamura and Nakamura 
(1985) show that the asymptotic bias of the OLS estimator will be smaller if (i) a larger 
proportion of the variability in the endogenous regressor is explained by the instrumental 
variables, and (ii) the goodness-of-fit is larger in the structural equation of the 
endogenous regressor. 
  
Construction of Governance Variables 
 
The Public Officials Survey consists of more than 200 questions that are mostly 
related to different aspects of governance. Although it is possible to choose one 
representative question for each dimension of governance, we choose to group several 
similar answers together for two reasons. First, choosing only one question is bound to be 
arbitrary since it is not based on objective criteria. Second, one question may be too 
“noisy” because of potential measurement errors or because it may fail to measure the 
aspect of governance we are interested in.  
  One way of grouping several questions is by taking the simple average.  This is 
not, however, the best method since it gives each question the same weight regardless of 
its deviation from the mean.  Instead, we use factor analytic techniques to detect the 
common structure in the information content of the questions. Thus, the aggregate 
variable represents only the information that is common to all of its sub-components.
13 
The reliability of all governance variables was checked using the Cronbach's alpha test. 
The alpha coefficient is never less than 0.80. In most of the cases, the coefficient is 
higher than 0.90. 
 
   
                                                                 
13 Preliminary results suggest that the two aggregation methods yield qualitatively similar results.    
  Table 1: Survey Questions Used to Construct Governance Variables 
Governance Variable  Question 
There exists some formal procedure to evaluate the performance of the 
employees. 
The policy/guidelines/regulations of personnel management are well 
supervised (violations are always exposed). 
The policy/guidelines/regulations of personnel management are strictly 
enforced (violations are always punished). 
The policy/guidelines/regulations of budget management are well 
supervised (violations are always exposed). 
The policy/guidelines/regulations of budget management are strictly 
enforced (violations are always punished). 
ENFORCEMENT of Rules in 
Personnel /Budget/Service 
Management 
The policy/guidelines/regulations of service management are well 
supervised (violations are always exposed). 
POLITICIZATION  Decisions on personnel management are based on political connections / 
party affiliations / political pressures. 
  Decisions on budget management are based on political connections / 
party affiliations / political pressures. 
  Decisions on service management are based on political connections / 
party affiliations / political pressures. 
TRANSPARENCY of decisions 
in personnel/budget/service 
management 
Decisions on personnel management are done transparently (everybody 
knows who were designated, promoted, transferred, ascended, or 
received wage increases and why). 
  Decisions on budget management are done transparently (everybody 
knows who were designated, promoted, transferred, ascended, or 
received wage increases and why). 
  Decisions on service delivery/performance of daily tasks are done 
transparently (everybody knows who were designated, promoted, 
transferred, ascended, or received wage increases and why). 
  Decisions on service delivery/performance of daily tasks are announced 
and opened to the internal of the institution (and also to the outside if 
they are applicable). 
  There is a clear understanding of what our tasks and responsibilities are. 
  I/My colleagues understand clearly what we have to do and that is why 
our performance is evaluated. 
MERITOCRACY  Percent of the cases the decisions on personnel management issues are 
based on professional experience.  
Percent of the cases the decisions on personnel management issues are 
based on professional merit and performance. 
 
Percent of the cases the decisions on personnel management issues are 
based on level of education. 
We all consider that citizens and users are our clients. 
Decisions on service delivery/performance of daily tasks are done based 
on users complaint. 
Clearly defined mechanisms exist to ask users about their needs. 
VOICE 
 
Clearly defined mechanisms exist so that the users can express their 
preferences. 




Percent of employees very satisfied or somewhat satisfied with their 
benefits (pension, health, etc.)  
HONESTY  The probability that if a public official was overpaid by an administrative 
error. The public official will return the money given that there is 100% 
chance of not getting caught and the superiors are doing the same without 
getting caught. 
Quantity of resources of the agency is adequate. 
Quality of resources of the agency is adequate. 
Personnel and their training of the agency are adequate. 
Office supplies / Computers of the agency are adequate. 
RESOURCES 
Space/ Offices of the agency are adequate. 
 